The Emancipation of Man in Latin A verroism and the Negation of Immortality
One universal characteristic of the Greek gods was their immortality. Nor was this attribution a mere anthropomorphic projection, an «aliena tion» in the sense of Feuerbach. On the contrary, the greatest gods of Homer and Hesiod are impersonal. Thus a hero could not be the son of Moira or Ouranos, although he could be the son of Zeus1. Immortality was posited in the heroes by establishing for them some kind of relationship with the gods. Immortality was recognized as a kind of possession of the divine. It was not the correction of an alienation whereby man even tually comes to attribute to himself what previously in his ignorance he attributed to the gods, but rather the recognition in man of some share in that transcendency and incorruptible power which were detected in the universe. Thus the gradual evolution of the notion of human immortality in Greek philosophy is not based upon anthropomorphic concepts but rather upon the recognition in man of something of the divine.
The anthropomorphic conception of the gods is constantly on the wane from the time of Homer and Hesiod, whereas the concept of human immortality grows ever clearer, to reach its fullest expression in Plato and Aristotle. The personal gods were to become more and more human until they merited no more than a casual lip service addressed to them on esthetic grounds or to justify otherwise reprehensible practices with a semblance of religion. The impersonal divine power on the other hand was to become more and more impersonal and assume its role, in the hands of the first philosophers, as the constituent stuff of the universe, endowed with divine qualities. This supreme causal power, ruling both the gods and the universe, was destined to receive an ever clearer and purified delineation. Human immortality appears in Greek philosophy simulta neously with a recognition of some participation of this divine power in man. Thus, far from being an appendage to a superstitious belief in the gods of Olympus, the gradual ascendency of a belief in human immortality owes itself rather to the growth of the belief that every man, and not just the few beloved by the gods, shared in some way in the divine power originating from a supreme natural productive force, from a divine subs tance, the exact nature of which the first Greek philosophers set out to resolve.
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The mystery religions had already secured for man a participation in the divine immortality by initiation when Thales undertook the first fundamentally rational explanation of the universe. It is noteworthy that whereas Homer and Hesiod in their partially anthropomorphic cosmo gonies did not postulate any innate immortality for man, Thales, on the other hand, in the first recorded rationalistic explanation, is also cited byThus, arriving at the peak of Greek philosophy, whose love of truth and healthy reason have always been taken as a model by subsequent philosophers, one is confronted with a distinct and unequivocal assertion of immortality. Possibly the place of the individual concrete man in this immortality remains obscure, but the destiny of man is certainly linked in a special way with the divine, the immortal. That man is a mere creature of clay who sinks back into the earth that bore him, there to be dissolved into dust and oblivion, is a thought completely foreign to Plato and Aristotle.
It is only with the advent of modem philosophy that in the name of enlightenment and emancipation all that is above man, that supreme and divine Goodness and Truth for which his soul instinctively yearns, the idea of a life that can rise above pure material necessity, is violently and brutally torn from his thoughts. His search for supreme truth and goodness is blocked at every turn and he is forced by all possible means, both physical and intellectual, to turn his gaze downward and seek his happiness in grovell ing in the earth.
Two thousand years after human reason had reached, in its effort to ascertain man's true nature, the heights of Plato and Aristotle, heights that the greatest Christian philosophers, St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, in their exposition of the natural doctrine of immortality for man, needed only to develop and clarify, modem philosophers, such as Feuerbach, Engels, Dewey and Russell have reached depths in their estimate of the true nature of man which place them far below even the most primitive of the philosophers of ancient Greece, whom, nevertheless, they pretend to emulate. Thus A. Levy can write of Feuerbach's Rimes on Death: «Il renonce au royaume des anges; il a des idées païennes, il ne veut pas aller chez les ombres, il préfère se disperser au sein de la nature et servir d'aliment aux vies nouvelles qui germent sans cesse. Tout le rythme du monde n'est qu une danse avec la mort; entrons joyeusement dans le cortège»1. Engels, who rejoiced that Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity had once more placed materialism on the throne, can say no more for the destiny of man. From the accent on life, which led the Greeks to the doctrine on immortality, now the accent is on death, on oblivion, on the inexorable extermination of man, body and soul.
Already no physiology is held to be scientific if it does not consider death as an essential factor of life, the negation of life as being essentially contained in life itself, so that hfe is always thought of in relation to its necessary result, death, which is always contained in it in germ. The dialectical conception of hfe is nothing more than this. But for anyone who has once understood this all talk of immortality of the soul is done away with. Here, therefore, by means of dialectics, simply be coming clear about the nature of life and death suffices to abolish an ancient supersti tion. Living means dying2.--Matter . . . with the same iron necessity . . . will exterminate on the earth its highest creation, the thinking mind .. .3
Thanks to such philosophers, John Dewey, who bears modestly upon his brow the laurels of the dean of American philosophers, can cheerfully announce, as though humanity had now reached the millenium and the fruition of centuries of thought: «The existence of God, immortality, dis embodied spirits, cosmic purpose and design, as these have been customarily interpreted by the great institutional religions, are denied by naturalists for the same generic reasons that they deny the existence of fairies, elves and leprechauns»4. The results of this magnificent emancipation are succinctly summed up by Bertrand Russell in his essay A Free M an's Worship: We must build our soul's habitation «on the firm foundations of unyielding despair»5.
How to explain this enormous perversion of the dignity of man? The explanation is already contained in the doctrine of the fall of the angels and in the fall of our first parents through pride, that seeking of one's own excellence through oneself and for oneself, a sin which is based upon excellence and which perversely grows with the magnitude of that excellence. The fitting natural punishment is that if man wants excellency of himself, he should tend towards that which he is of himself,-nothing. This trend towards nothingness is clearly distinguishable in the evolution of modern philosophy: in order to be what he is of himself, man must eliminate all that bespeaks more expressly a dependence upon God, and in particular, immortality. One may scorn such a scriptural and theological prevision of man's revolt as a myth, or at best a divinized projection of man's own nature, but the historical fact remains that the independent seeking of man's excellence, the attempt to establish a homocentric universe, which began with Averroism and the Renaissance, has led step by step to the progressive denial of the very attributes upon which that excellence is founded. The striving of man to be his own God is leading him steadily to debase himself lower than animals, lower than plants, lower than matter, to absolute nothingness.
Thus, in the interests of holding his own excellence for himself, man in revolt is led to deny the most sublime even of his natural prerogatives, that which raises him above and beyond all the vast material universe, namely, his spirituality and consequent immortality. In seeking to be great by himself and through himself man necessarily abdicates from those very goods which constitute the greatness which is his goal.
It is often taken for granted that the emancipation of human reason coupled with the negation of immortality first took form during the period of the Renaissance. In the words of Engels the Renaissance «was the greatest revolution that the world has so far experienced». Burckhardt 2. We coniine ourselves to Siger as St. Thomas knew him, that is, the Averroist of the «manière forte». The Siger «manière mitigée» revealed in later works present ed by F. V a n S t e e n b e r g h e n (Siger There was no first man. There is numerically only one intelligence for all men. It is false or improper to say that it is man who understands. The soul which is the form of man as such is destroyed by death. God cannot give immortality or incorruptibility to a thing which is corruptible and mortal. The separated soul after death cannot suffer by corporeal fire. All that takes place in the world is subject to the influence of the heavenly bodies. The will of man wishes or chooses under the empire of necessity. Free will is a passive not an active power, and is necessarily moved by its desires1.
All these notions can be derived from the notion of the intellect in Averroistic doctrine. It is of such a nature that it supersedes God and divests the individual man of responsibility for his actions. This doctrine is contained in the treaty De Necessitate et contingentia causarum of Siger's school. The first cause produces of itself, immediately and necessarily, the first intelligence, which is thus co-eternal with it. It is the sole imme diate effect of the first cause which produces all other beings through the mediation of subordinated causes. Whatever thus proceeds is produced necessarily but in a certain order. It follows that the production of the world and its coexistence with the first cause are necessary and eternal. Furthermore, once God has produced the world which proceeds from Him by necessity of nature as opposed to free creation by science and will, He has no further control over it, since the first cause produces its effects only through intermediary causes such as the celestial bodies. The effect of these causes can be impeded and sometimes is. Thus contingency reigns in the world and the only necessity here recognized is due merely to the fact that an effect is not impeded, i.e. things happen here below of necessity only when no obstacle happens to prevent them from happening necessarily2! Hence, God is no Lord of the world, can have no concern for it, and in this sense can be said to have no connection with it. While He is mediately its cause, yet the world has the independence of being necessarily produced by Him and as eternal as God Himself. There is, then, a respect in which the creatures are commensurate with God, and in this they are independent of Him. They are subject to no laws since their necessity is none other than the necessity of the world's being. And even the very truth concerning the universal nature of these beings is posterior to, and dependent upon their givenness in singular concretion. Thus the state ment «man is rational animal» can be true only if man actually exists3. In other words, the creature becomes, in its own physical being, the very measure of any universal truth concerning its nature. This again brings out sharply a radical independence.
At first sight, the Averroistic strife for the emancipation of man seems to be just the opposite of the emancipation and self-redemption of man, since its teaching of the numerical unity of the human intellect involves This arbitrary interpretation of Aristotle in the name of the authority of reason unfettered is further confirmed by what the Averroists actually hold Aristotle to teach concerning the unity, or unicity, of the human intellect, and the truth of a proposition such as «man is rational». We insist upon the unity of truth, which is the measure of intellect in speculative matters. The divine intellect is the cause of the truth of things and it is one. Our intellect, however, is subject to opinion. For the Averroist, human reason is one and it shines forth so completely in Aristotle that what the letter of Aristotle says becomes the authority for all future thought. Aristotle's letter becomes as the temporal measure for all human learning. Thus, the human intellect becomes prior to the things themselves from which knowledge should come to us, and its unity is substituted for the unity of truth. In making this rapprochement between the divine unity of truth and the unity of the Averroistic intellect, one is only drawing the very conclusion that St. Thomas drew in his Opusculum, namely, that the Averroistic intellect is not only separated but is God Himself1.
According to the Averroists, that intellect which is the best in man, is eternal. Along with the world, it is necessarily co-eternal with God. In this absolutely necessary universe, the separated intellect of man is as secure as God Himself. Hence the Averroistic insistence, from the philo sophical point of view, on the eternity of the universe. The Thomistic position that, from the viewpoint of philosophy, it is impossible to ascertain whether the world is eternal or not, since this depends upon whether God freely wills it to be from all eternity or not, was to the Averroists a blemish both on the being and on the power of the human intellect left to itself. Such uncertainty would mean that, without revealed truth, one cannot determine by oneself the actual condition of what is greatest in man. It is only if the one intellect is both eternal and able to demonstrate its necessity, its eternity, that it can make a complete reditio ad principium to itself as to an absolute self even in the face of God. Whether this intellect is ours in the personal sense or not, the important thing is that it is «in us», and that we can hold up that which is in us as self-possessive in its necessary
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eternity. The eternity of the world and of the human intellect is thus an emancipation from all contingency, an exaltation of the self in the un created super-self at the expense of God's freedom and of His concern for us. This emancipation from contingency is thus at the same time an emancipa tion from the absolutely necessary being that is God. Man cannot raise himself above himself, by himself, without diminishing the divinity itself.
Averroism not only emancipates the intellect and the world as a whole from God by conferring upon them absolute necessity, but it deprives God of the knowledge of singulars and of that which is left of contingency in the universe. This too is an emancipation of the world from God. Divine government does not reach the singulars, nor does it reach human actions. In our necessity, the realm of singulars and contingency is really ours. The world of man is thus complete in itself. Man is fully at home with himself. Actually, the Averroist holds that God should concern us no more than we concern Him. One is left to wonder why God should be at all. Indeed Averroism is much more radical than the In refuting the Averroistic interpretation by reason, St. Thomas exposes the manifest absurdities they involve. If the intellect is separated, so also is the will, and morality perishes. Reflecting, and making laws become vain, and social and civil life is destroyed1. Thus those who followed Siger's doctrines could say that if St. Peter was saved, all men were saved and there was no need for any special striving on the part of the individual. Likewise it would be impossible to learn anything from a teacher or from experience, since by the unity of the intellect one would already possess the teacher's knowledge and the separated state of the intellect· would dispense with the phantasms of experience. Thus truth becomes independent both of science and experience. The separated in tellect becomes God, since all knowledge is one both objectively and numer ically. Likewise, since knowledge is a knowledge of species, i.e. of the means of knowing, not of things, knowledge is not truly objective, as Kant was later to announce as a great discovery2.
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